Applications of the Principle: "The Ruling of the Ruler or his Representative Resolves the Dispute"

 

All perfect praise be to Allah the Lord of the Worlds. May His peace and blessings be upon Prophet Mohammad and upon all his family and companions.

Human beings are naturally social creatures, as their well-being and interests cannot be achieved without interacting with others and establishing various relationships. Social interaction is a fundamental human necessity through which the earth is cultivated and civilizations flourish. For this reason, Allah commands unity and forbids division, as He Says (What means): "And hold firmly to the rope of Allah all together and do not become divided." [Al-Imran/103]. The foundation of civilization is built on human diversity and the fact that people are not identical. This diversity fosters a complementary relationship where each person completes what is lacking in others. Differences take many forms, including variations in language and color, as Allah The Almighty States (What means): "And among His signs is the creation of the heavens and the earth and the diversity of your languages and colors." [Ar-Rum/22]. There are also differences in religious laws and ways of life as stated in the Holy Quran (What means): "To each of you We prescribed a law and a method." [Al-Ma’idah/48]. Furthermore, diversity exists in identity, it states also (What means): "And We made you into nations and tribes so that you may know one another." [Al-Hujurat/13]. The Quran affirms that this diversity is a divine will, as Allah Says (What means): "And if your Lord had willed, He could have made mankind one community, but they will not cease to differ, except those upon whom your Lord has bestowed His mercy. And for that reason, He created them." [Hud/118-119]. Scholars have differed on the meaning of "And for that reason, He created them." Some, like Al-Hasan Al-Basri, say it refers to the fact that Allah, The Exalted created people to differ. Others, such as Ata’, say it refers to mercy, meaning that He created them to show them mercy. A third view, held by scholars like Ibn Jarir At-Tabari and Ibn Kathir, combines both meanings: Allah created people to differ, and He grants mercy to those who follow the straight path [1].

A human being can never be completely independent in fulfilling all of their needs; by nature, they require cooperation with others. This cooperation necessitates negotiation, partnership, and various transactions. However, when interests align while opinions, thoughts, and beliefs differ, transactions may lead to disputes and conflicts. As a result, alliances and hostilities arise, friendships and enmities form, and ultimately, relations between nations and tribes may escalate to war or peace. For this reason, society requires a ruler who resolves disputes, supports the oppressed, and serves as a reference in times of conflict. The appointment of a ruler is thus a social necessity that regulates people’s lives, safeguards their religion and rights, and maintains order. Al-Juwayni defines leadership (Imāmah) as: "A comprehensive authority and general leadership that pertains to both the elite and the common people, covering the essential matters of religion and worldly affairs. Its function is to protect the community, oversee the well-being of the subjects, uphold the faith through both argument and force, suppress fear [2] and oppression [3], secure justice for the oppressed against the oppressors, collect dues from those who withhold them, and deliver rights to their rightful recipients [4]." Similarly, Al-Jurjani defines the ruler as: "The one who holds general authority over both religious and worldly matters. [5]" One of the most significant legal principles that facilitate societal affairs, ensure the smooth governance of the state, and fulfill the purpose of appointing a ruler is the maxim established by Muslim jurists and fundamentalists: "The ruling of the judge removes disagreement. [6]" This means that once a judge or ruler issues a verdict or judgment, it puts an end to disputes and unifies people under a single ruling [7]. Al-Qarafi states in Al-Furuq: "The ruling of the judge in matters of independent legal reasoning (Ijtihad) removes disagreement, requiring the dissenter to abandon their own school of thought and conform to the ruling of the judge. Accordingly, their legal verdict (Fatwa) must change post-judgment from what it was before, according to the correct position among scholars. [8]"

The Difference Between Disagreement (Khilaaf) and Difference (Ikhtilaf)

Disagreement (Khilaaf): It is a dispute that arises between opposing parties to establish a right or to invalidate falsehood [9]. It carries within it the meaning of conflict, discord, and real divergence. Difference (Ikhtilaf): It is when each person takes a different path from the other in their actions or statements [10]. Difference occurs in means while maintaining unity in purpose among those who differ, whereas disagreement involves differences in both means and objectives.

The author of "Al-Durr Al-Mukhtar" differentiates between them by stating that difference (Ikhtilaf) is based on evidence, whereas disagreement (Khilaaf) lacks a valid basis [11]. This implies that difference is a natural outcome of varying understandings and proper methods of reasoning, aimed at reaching the truth. However, disagreement often stems from personal desires, with the goal being victory for an opinion, an idea, or the one presenting it, rather than the pursuit of truth. In Islamic jurisprudence, the meanings of disagreement and difference do not significantly differ from their linguistic meanings, except that they are restricted to jurisprudential issues. Islamic scholars use the term disagreement (Khilaaf) to refer to jurisprudential matters that lack consensus. By nature, difference does not imply conflict or discord, but people's tendencies towards intolerance and their inability to accept opposing views often turn mere differences into disputes. Thus, scholars frequently use expressions such as: "This is a difference, not a disagreement," when the difference is merely verbal and reconciliation between views is possible. "This is a difference of diversity, not contradiction," when multiple perspectives can coexist without contradiction. "This is a real or fundamental disagreement," when the dispute is deep-rooted and significant.

Types of Disagreement (Khilaaf)

The disagreements among scholars’ opinions can be classified into two main categories:

1. Acceptable (Praiseworthy) Disagreement (Khilaaf Saa’igh)

This refers to differences in matters of juristic interpretation (Zanni issues), which are numerous. A clear example of this is the extensive disagreement among jurists on various Fiqh issues, spanning from the rulings of purification (Taharah) to acknowledgments (Iqrār). Some examples include: Classification of water types. Whether a dog is impure. The duration for wiping over leather socks. The maximum length of menstruation. Whether Qunoot (supplication) in Fajr prayer is obligatory. Raising the hands during prayer. Performing prayers with specific reasons (such as solar eclipse prayer) during prohibited times. The extent of a woman’s required covering. Whether pronouncing three divorces at once counts as one or three. This type of disagreement does not contradict explicit texts (Nass) or previous scholarly consensus (Ijma‘) and arises from qualified scholars exercising independent reasoning (Ijtihad). The causes for such disagreement include: Differences in understanding the meaning of a text. Differences in the authenticity (Thuboot) of a narration. Differences regarding abrogation (Naskh) of a ruling. Differences in how to reconcile multiple evidences. For this type of disagreement, the one who is correct gets two rewards, while the one who errs gets one reward. A well-known example from the Prophet’s time illustrates this acceptable difference: Ibn Umar (may Allah be pleased with them) reported that when the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) returned from the Battle of the Trench, he said: "None of you should pray Asr except in Banu Qurayza." Some companions understood this literally and delayed the prayer until they reached Banu Qurayza, while others interpreted it as an encouragement to hasten but not a strict command, so they prayed on the way. When the incident was reported to the Prophet (peace be upon him), he did not rebuke either group [12]. 

2. Unacceptable (Blameworthy) Disagreement (Khilaaf Ghayr Saa’igh)

This refers to disagreements over matters that are definitive in both transmission (Qat‘i Al-Thuboot) and meaning (Qat‘i Al-Dalalah). These include: The obligation of prayer, fasting, and zakat. The punishment of cutting the hand of a thief. The stoning of the adulterer. The prohibition of alcohol. Disagreement in such matters is not permissible, because if it were allowed, then no fundamental ruling in Islam would remain fixed—every ruling would become subject to debate.

Imam Al-Shafi‘i discussed these two categories of disagreement in his book "Al-Risalah" through a profound dialogue:

The questioner said: "I see that scholars, both past and present, have differed in some matters. Is this permissible?"

Imam Al-Shafi‘i replied: "Disagreement is of two types: one is prohibited, while the other is not."

The questioner asked: "What is the prohibited type of disagreement?"

Al-Shafi‘i responded: "Any matter in which Allah has established a decisive proof in His Book or on the tongue of His Prophet (peace be upon him), with a clear and explicit text, then disagreement in such matters is not allowed for those who know the ruling."

The questioner continued: "And what about the other type?"

Al-Shafi‘i answered: "If a ruling allows for interpretation and can be understood through analogy, and if someone applies Ijtihad (independent reasoning) and derives a meaning that the text or analogy supports—while another scholar disagrees—then I do not say that such disagreement is forbidden."

To distinguish between these two types of disagreement, Imam Al-Shafi‘i provided Quranic evidence: Allah condemns division when clear proof has already been revealed, as He The Exalted Says (What means): "And the People of the Book did not become divided until after clear evidence had come to them." [Al-Bayyinah/4]. Likewise, Allah warns against following the path of those who dispute after receiving clear signs; whereas, He Says (What means): "And do not be like those who split into factions and differed after clear proofs had come to them. For them is a great punishment." [Al-Imran/105]. Thus, disagreement in clear, decisive matters—where evidence is explicit—is condemned, while disagreement in issues requiring scholarly interpretation is permissible, just like differences in determining the Qiblah and the acceptance of witness testimony [13].

Al-Zarkashi’s Classification of Disagreement

Al-Zarkashi further elaborated on this concept by dividing matters of disagreement into three categories: Issues where Ijtihad is not permissible: These are rulings established by definitive evidence (Qat‘i) and known by necessity to be part of the religion. Examples include: the obligation of the five daily prayers, fasting in Ramadan, the prohibition of adultery and alcohol. Denying such rulings constitutes disbelief (Kufr), as it amounts to rejecting Allah and His Messenger. Issues where Ijtihad is not permissible but denial does not amount to disbelief: These are rulings based on strong definitive proofs, such as the prohibition of selling by tossing pebbles (bay‘Al-Hasa) or the prohibition of pork. Disagreeing in these matters makes one sinful but not a disbeliever. Issues where Ijtihad is permissible: These are disputed juristic issues (Furu‘) where no clear text exists, and the evidence is subject to different interpretations. Examples include: whether zakat is obligatory on a child's wealth, and whether Witr prayer is obligatory. In such cases, a scholar exercising Ijtihad is not sinful, even if their conclusion is incorrect. [14].

Applications of the Rule "The Ruling of the Ruler Resolves Disputes"

The implementation of the ruler's decisions over their subjects and their binding nature depends on the existence of the benefits and outcomes that result from their actions, whether religious or worldly. Therefore, scholars have established the principle: "The ruler's actions over the subjects are contingent on public interest [15]." This principle sets the boundaries for public administration and the application of Islamic law in the authority of rulers and their decisions over their subjects. It implies that the ruler's actions, which affect the people, must be based on the welfare of the community, as they act as agents of the nation to adopt the best measures to establish justice, eliminate oppression, protect rights and ethics, maintain security, spread knowledge, purify society from corruption, and achieve all that is beneficial for the nation using the best means. Al-Izz ibn Abd Al-Salam emphasized this meaning by saying: "Rulers and their deputies’ act in ways that are best for those under their care, aiming to avoid harm and corruption and bringing about benefit and guidance. [16]" What the ruler does that does not serve a general public interest is generally not binding unless it is strongly believed that violating it may lead to strife and harm. Al-Ghazali mentioned the consensus on the prohibition of opposing the ruler’s judgment, stating: "The consensus indicates the prohibition of opposing the judgment of the supreme ruler, because the welfare of the people lies in following the ruler's opinion. [17]"

The resolution of disputes by the ruler is only practical in nature. From a scholarly perspective, the ruler's judgment and enforcement do not alter the Islamic legal rulings, nor do they give preference to one opinion over another. The scholarly dispute remains as it is. Al-Kharshee, the Maliki scholar, states: "The resolution of a dispute does not make what is forbidden permissible." This means that if the ruler’s decision is correct, it nullifies the effect of the disagreement in practice. However, the disagreement remains unchanged among scholars. For example, if someone does not accept a specific rule about shared property, and the ruler rules in favor of its validity, then the decision is to be carried out by those who disagree, and they cannot annul it. Similarly, if a man says to a woman, "If I marry you, you will be divorced," and they marry, and the ruler rules that the marriage is valid, then those who consider the divorce to be valid must comply with the marriage and cannot annul it. [18]"

Thus, the head of state has the authority to choose from among the various scholarly opinions that are most suitable for the times and that achieve the public interest, and to enforce them upon the citizens. This is in line with the objectives of appointing the ruler and in order to end disputes, provided the ruler is capable of Ijtihad. If not, he should appoint someone who is qualified to do so. The closest contemporary example of this in our time are the Fiqh councils, fatwa bodies, judiciary, and religious endowments, which include a respected group of scholars and jurists. The rulings of these bodies, as representatives of the ruler who appointed them, serve to resolve disputes. Al-Azz Ibn Abd Al-Salam states: "There is no obedience to any created being except to those whom Allah has authorized obedience, such as the messengers, scholars, imams, judges, rulers, parents, masters, spouses, and those contracted for specific tasks and industries. And there is no obedience to anyone in disobedience to Allah, as it causes corruption in both worlds or in one of them. So, if someone orders disobedience, there is no hearing or obedience to them.[19]"

Firstly: Applying the Rule to the Issue of the Obligatory Bequest

The four Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali) hold that a son prevents a grandson (son of a son) from inheriting [20]. Thus, if someone dies leaving behind grandsons (sons of a son), and that son had died before or at the same time as him, then the grandson (whose father died during his grandfather's lifetime) inherits the share of the son if the grandfather has no surviving male children. However, if the grandfather has surviving male children, the grandson is excluded from inheritance by the presence of this son. Some scholars, however, are of the opinion that a bequest is obligatory for close relatives who are not heirs. This is a view narrated from Ibn Abbas, Masruq, al-Dahhak, Muslim Ibn Yasar, Al-Ala' Ibn Ziyad, Sa'id Ibn 

Al-Musayyib, Al-Hasan Al-Basri, Tawus, Ibn Hazm [21], and others. They base their opinion on the verse of the Quran, it states (What means): "Prescribed for you, when death approaches any of you, if he leave any goods, that he make a bequest to parents and kindred according to reasonable usage; a duty incumbent on the God-fearing" [Al-Baqarah/180]. They argue that this verse has been abrogated (Mansukh) with regard to those who inherit, but remains in effect for those who do not inherit.

If the ruler decides to adopt the opinion of those who say that a bequest is obligatory for close relatives, his decision resolves the dispute. This is why the Jordanian Personal Status Law No. (15) of 2019 adopted this opinion and limited the obligation of the bequest to the grandchildren whose father died before or at the same time as their grandfather. This is in line with the spirit of Islamic legislation. "Perhaps one of the most prominent reasons for this is that these grandchildren may be poor and in need, especially since they are often young in age. Since the inheritance system does not allocate anything from the inheritance of their grandfather or grandmother to them due to the presence of their paternal uncles or aunts, the law resorted to adopting the opinion of the jurists who say that the bequest is obligatory to address this problem, in line with the spirit of Islamic legislation" ([22]). The Jordanian Personal Status Law states in Article (279) ([23]): "If a person dies and has grandchildren (sons of a son), and that son died before him or at the same time as him, these grandchildren are entitled to a bequest from one-third of his estate, according to the following amount and conditions:"

A. The obligatory bequest shall be equal to the share they would have inherited from the deceased ancestor if their father had died immediately after the said ancestor, provided that it does not exceed one-third of the estate.

B. The grandchildren are not entitled to a bequest if they are heirs of their father's ascendant, whether grandfather or grandmother, unless the obligatory shares of the entitled heirs exhaust the estate.

C. The grandchildren are not entitled to a bequest if their grandfather had already bequeathed to them or given them during his lifetime, without compensation, an amount equal to what they are entitled to in this obligatory bequest. If he bequeathed to them or gave them less than that, the amount must be completed. If he bequeathed to them more, the excess is considered a voluntary bequest. If he bequeathed to some of them, it is obligatory for the others to receive their due share.

D. The bequest is for the children of the son and the children of the son's son, even if they are more distant descendants. The share for males is twice the share for females. Each ascendant excludes their own descendants, not the descendants of others, and each descendant takes only what they are entitled to from their own ascendant's share.

E. The obligatory bequest takes precedence over voluntary bequests in the fulfillment from one-third of the estate.

This law has practically resolved the dispute, and it is not permissible to issue a fatwa contrary to it, in accordance with the principle: "The ruler's decision resolves the dispute."

Second: Applying the Rule to the Issue of Repeating the Funeral Prayer

Scholars have differed regarding the permissibility of repeating the funeral prayer for a deceased person by someone who did not initially pray over them.

The Hanafi school holds that repeating the funeral prayer for the deceased is not permissible in any case, whether by those who have already prayed over the deceased or by those who have not. However, they make an exception for the guardian (Wali) of the deceased—if the guardian was not present at the first prayer, he is allowed to perform it, as it is his right. As for others, they are not permitted to perform the funeral prayer after it has already been conducted. Imam Al-Kasani stated in "Bada'i Al-Sana'i fi Tartib Al-Shara'I": "A funeral prayer should not be performed over a deceased person more than once, whether in congregation or individually, according to our view. However, if those who performed the prayer were strangers and did so without the consent of the guardian, and then the guardian arrived, he is then entitled to repeat it." ([24]).

The Maliki school of thought holds that it is disliked (Makruh) to repeat the funeral prayer for the deceased, whether by those who have already prayed it or those who have not, if it was prayed in congregation and repeated in congregation, or if it was prayed in congregation and repeated individually, or if it was prayed individually and repeated individually. However, if it was prayed individually and repeated in congregation, it is recommended (Mustahabb) to repeat it before burial, in order to obtain the reward of praying in congregation. Sheikh Alish said in "Minah Al-Jalil ": "(And it is not repeated)... meaning: the funeral prayer for the deceased, i.e., it is disliked to repeat it if it was prayed in congregation in any case, or individually and then repeated in the same manner. But if it is repeated in congregation, then it is not disliked. Thus, there are four scenarios: repetition is disliked in three, and recommended in one." ([25])

The Shafi'i school permits repeating the funeral prayer over the deceased after it has already been performed. Imam Al-Juwayni stated:

"If a group has performed the funeral prayer over the deceased, fulfilling the communal obligation (Fard Kifayah), another group is permitted to perform it again, according to our school." ([26]). Similarly, Al-Ramli mentioned in "Al-Nihayah": (If the funeral prayer has been performed over the deceased), and someone who did not pray over them arrives, (they may perform the prayer) as a recommended act, whether before or after burial. As stated in 'Al-Majmu',' they should intend it as an obligatory prayer." ([27])

The Hanbali school of thought holds that it is disliked (Makruh) for someone who has already prayed the funeral prayer to repeat it, except for a valid reason, such as being the person most entitled to lead the prayer for the deceased. However, they permit it for someone who did not pray the funeral prayer initially. In [Al-Insaf] it states: "A benefit: It is disliked for someone who has already prayed the funeral prayer to repeat it a second time, according to the correct view of the [Hanbali] school - until he says -: Whoever misses the funeral prayer can pray on the grave for up to a month." ([28])

The scholars also differed regarding the ruling on praying for the deceased who is absent (Salat Al-Gha'ib). The Shafi'i and Hanbali schools of thought hold that praying for the absent deceased is legitimate and permissible in all cases for a Muslim who dies in another location. In "Mughni Al-Muhtaj" by Al-Shirbini, it states: "It is permissible to pray for the absent deceased, even if the distance is short and the body is not in the direction of the Qibla, contrary to Abu Hanifa and Malik. This is because the Prophet, peace be upon him, informed the people in Medina of the death of the Negus in Abyssinia on the day he died, and he went out with them to the prayer place, arranged them in rows, and prayed four Takbirs (opening pronouncements of the prayer) over him" ([29]) ([30]). In "Al-Mughni' by Ibn Qudamah, it states: "It is permissible to pray for the absent deceased in another location with the proper intention. The person faces the Qibla and prays as they would for a present deceased person, regardless of whether the deceased is in the direction of the Qibla or not, and regardless of whether the distance between the two locations is that which makes travel shortening of prayer permissible or not... Our evidence is that we follow the example of the Prophet, peace be upon him, unless there is evidence that proves it was specific to him." ([31])

The Hanafi and Maliki schools of thought hold that praying for the absent deceased (Salat al-Gha'ib) is not permissible. In "al-Durr al-Mukhtar", it states: "The funeral prayer is not valid for an absent person, nor for one carried on an animal or placed behind it, because it is like an imam in some ways but not others, due to its validity for a child. The Prophet's prayer, peace be upon him, for the Negus was either a linguistic (expression of grief) or a specific (to him) dispensation" ([32]). In "Sharh al-Kharshi", it states: "And 'absent' means that it is disliked to pray for an absent person... His prayer, peace be upon him, for the Negus was one of his specific (privileges)." ([33])

The ruling on repeating the funeral prayer that has already been performed, and the prayer for the absent deceased, is a matter of scholarly disagreement, between those who prohibit it and those who permit it. If the ruler orders the prayer for the absent deceased and the repetition of the prayer for one who has died and has already been prayed over, then it is obligatory to pray for them and not to disobey his command, because (the ruler's decision resolves the dispute).

 

 

References:

[1] –Check:

Al-Tabari: Muhammad bin Jarir bin Yazid bin Kathir bin Ghalib Al-Amali, Abu Ja'far Al-Tabari (d. 310 AH / 922 CE), Tafsir Al-Tabari: Jami' Al-Bayan fi Ta'wil Al-Qur'an, edited by Ahmad Muhammad Shakir, Mu'assasat Al-Risalah, 1420 AH - 2000 CE (1st edition), vol. 15, p. 535.

Ibn Kathir: Abu Al-Fida Ismail bin Umar bin Kathir Al-Qurashi Al-Basri, then Al-Dimashqi (d. 774 AH / 1372 CE), Tafsir Al-Qur'an Al-'Azim, edited by Sami bin Muhammad Salamah, Dar Tayyibah lil-Nashr wal-Tawzi', 1420 AH - 1999 CE (2nd edition), vol. 4, p. 362.

Al-Sa'di in Tafsir Al-Karim Al-Rahman fi Tafsir Kalam Al-Mannan (p. 392) said:

"And His statement: (وَلِذَٰلِكَ خَلَقَهُمْ) 'And for that He created them' means that His wisdom necessitated that He created them so that among them would be the blessed and the wretched, the agreeing and the differing, the group guided by Allah, and the group upon whom misguidance is decreed. This is so that Allah's justice and wisdom may become evident to His servants, and so that what lies hidden within human nature—both good and evil—may be revealed, and so that the test and trial through which acts of worship and jihad are perfected and maintained may take place."

[2] - Ibn Jinni stated: "The root of the word 'khayf' (الخيف) is 'difference,' because it refers to land that is neither a mountain peak nor a valley, thus differing from both. Similarly, the term 'people are akhyaf' (أخياف) means they are different."

He also quoted a line of poetry:

"People are akhyaf and diverse in character, yet all are gathered under the house of Adam."

See:

Al-Hamawi: Shihab al-Din Abu Abdullah Yaqut bin Abdullah Al-Rumi Al-Hamawi (d. 626 AH / 1228 CE), Mu'jam Al-Buldan, Beirut, Dar Sader, 1995 CE (2nd edition), vol. 2, p. 412.

[3] - Hayf (الحيف) means deviation in judgment, injustice, and oppression.

Check:

Ibn Manzur: Muhammad bin Mukarram bin Ali, Abu Al-Fadl, Jamal Al-Din Ibn Manzur Al-Ansari Al-Ruwaifi Al-Ifriqi (d. 711 AH / 1311 CE), Lisan Al-Arab, Beirut, Dar Sader, 1414 AH (3rd edition), vol. 9, p. 60.

[4] - Al-Juwayni: Abdul Malik bin Abdullah bin Yusuf bin Muhammad Al-Juwayni, Abu Al-Ma'ali, Rukn Al-Din, known as Imam Al-Haramayn (d. 478 AH / 1085 CE), Ghayath Al-Umam fi Iltiyath Al-Zhulam, edited by Abdul Azim Al-Deeb, Maktabat Imam Al-Haramayn, 1401 AH (2nd edition), p. 22.

[5] - Al-Jurjani: Ali bin Muhammad bin Ali Al-Zain Al-Sharif Al-Jurjani (d. 816 AH / 1413 CE), Al-Ta'rifat, edited and verified by a group of scholars, Beirut, Dar Al-Kutub Al-Ilmiyyah, 1403 AH - 1983 CE (1st edition), p. 35.

[6] -Check:

Al-Makki: Ahmad bin Muhammad Makki, Abu Al-Abbas, Shihab Al-Din Al-Husayni Al-Hamawi Al-Hanafi (d. 1098 AH), Ghamz 'Uyun Al-Basa'ir fi Sharh Al-Ashbah wa Al-Naza'ir, published by Dar Al-Kutub Al-Ilmiyyah, 1st edition, 1405 AH - 1985 CE, vol. 3, p. 113.

[7] -Check:

Group of authors: (Ibrahim Mustafa / Ahmed Al-Zayyat / Hamed Abdel Qader / Muhammad Al-Najjar), Al-Mu'jam Al-Wasit, Cairo, Arabic Language Academy, Dar Al-Da’wah, vol. 1, p. 360.

[8] - Al-Qarafi: Abu Al-Abbas Shihab Al-Din Ahmad bin Idris bin Abdul Rahman Al-Maliki, known as Al-Qarafi (d. 684 AH / 1285 CE), Al-Furuq, Alam Al-Kutub, vol. 2, p. 103.

[9] - Al-Jurjani: Al-Ta'rifat, p. 101.

[10] - Al-Raghib Al-Isfahani: Abu Al-Qasim Al-Husayn bin Muhammad, known as Al-Raghib Al-Isfahani (d. 502 AH), Al-Mufradat, edited by Safwan Adnan Al-Daoudi, published by Dar Al-Qalam, Al-Dar Al-Shamiya - Damascus & Beirut, 1st edition, 1412 AH, p. 294.

[11] -Check:

Al-Haskafi: Muhammad bin Ali bin Muhammad bin Ali bin Abdul Rahman Al-Hanafi Al-Haskafi (d. 1088 AH), Al-Durr Al-Mukhtar, verified and edited by Abdul Mun'im Khalil Ibrahim, published by Dar Al-Kutub Al-Ilmiyyah – Beirut, 1st edition, 1423 AH - 2002 CE, p. 470.

[12] - Al-Bukhari: Abu Abdullah, Muhammad bin Ismail bin Ibrahim bin Al-Mughira bin Bardizbah Al-Bukhari Al-Ju'fi (d. 256 AH), Sahih Al-Bukhari, edited by Dr. Mustafa Dib Al-Bugha, published by (Dar Ibn Kathir, Dar Al-Yamamah) – Damascus, 5th edition, 1414 AH - 1993 CE, Book of Maghazi, Chapter: The Prophet’s Return from the Confederates and His March to Banu Qurayza, Hadith No. 3893, vol. 4, p. 1510

 

[13] - Al-Shafi'i: Muhammad bin Idris Al-Shafi'i (150 AH - 204 AH), Al-Risala, edited and explained by Ahmed Muhammad Shakir (based on the original manuscript written by Al-Rabi' bin Sulayman during Al-Shafi'i’s lifetime), published by Mustafa Al-Babi Al-Halabi & Sons – Egypt, 1st edition, 1357 AH - 1938 CE, pp. 560-561.

[14] - Al-Zarkashi: Abu Abdullah Badr Al-Din Muhammad bin Abdullah bin Bahadir Al-Zarkashi (d. 794 AH), Al-Bahr Al-Muhit fi Usul Al-Fiqh, published by Dar Al-Kutbi, 1st edition, 1414 AH - 1994 CE, pp. 7-8.

[15] -Check:

Ibn Nujaym: Zain Al-Din bin Ibrahim bin Muhammad, known as Ibn Nujaym Al-Misri (d. 970 AH / 1562 CE), Al-Ashbah wa Al-Nazair 'ala Madhhab Abi Hanifa Al-Nu'man, with annotations and hadith verification by Sheikh Zakariya Umayrat, Beirut – Lebanon, Dar Al-Kutub Al-Ilmiyyah, 1st edition, 1419 AH - 1999 CE, p. 104.

Al-Suyuti: Abdul Rahman bin Abi Bakr, Jalal Al-Din Al-Suyuti (d. 911 AH / 1505 CE), Al-Ashbah wa Al-Nazair, Dar Al-Kutub Al-Ilmiyyah, 1st edition, 1411 AH - 1990 CE, p. 121.

[16] - Ibn Abd Al-Salam: Abu Muhammad Izz Al-Din Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Salam bin Abi Al-Qasim bin Al-Hasan Al-Sulami Al-Dimashqi, known as Sultan Al-Ulama (d. 660 AH / 1261 CE), Qawa'id Al-Ahkam fi Masalih Al-Anam, reviewed and annotated by Taha Abdul Rauf Saad, Cairo, Maktabat Al-Kulliyat Al-Azhariyyah, 1414 AH - 1991 CE, vol. 2, p. 89.

[17] - Al-Ghazali: Abu Hamid Muhammad bin Muhammad Al-Ghazali Al-Tusi (d. 505 AH / 1111 CE), Al-Mustasfa, edited by Muhammad Abdul Salam Abdul Shafi, Dar Al-Kutub Al-Ilmiyyah, 1st edition, 1413 AH - 1993 CE, p. 346.

[18] - Al-Kharshi: Muhammad bin Abdullah Al-Kharshi Al-Maliki Abu Abdullah (d. 1101 AH / 1689 CE), Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil, Beirut, Dar Al-Fikr, vol. 7, p. 166.

[19] - Izz bin Abd Al-Salam, Qawa'id Al-Ahkam fi Masalih Al-Anam, vol. 2, p. 157.

[20] -Check:

Al-Zayla'i: Uthman bin Ali bin Muhjin Al-Bari'i, Fakhr Al-Din Al-Zayla'i Al-Hanafi (d. 743 AH / 1342 CE), Tabyin Al-Haqa’iq Sharh Kanz Al-Daqa’iq with the marginal notes of Shihab Al-Din Ahmad bin Muhammad bin Ahmad bin Yunus Al-Shilbi (d. 1021 AH), Cairo, Al-Matba’a Al-Kubra Al-Amiriyyah, 1st edition, 1313 AH, vol. 6, p. 234.

Al-Qarafi: Abu Al-Abbas Shihab Al-Din Ahmad bin Idris bin Abdul Rahman Al-Maliki, known as Al-Qarafi (d. 684 AH / 1285 CE), Al-Dhakhira, edited by Muhammad Hajji, Beirut, Dar Al-Gharb Al-Islami, 1st edition, 1994 CE, vol. 13, p. 42.

Al-Damiri: Kamal Al-Din Muhammad bin Musa bin Isa bin Ali Al-Damiri Abu Al-Baqa Al-Shafi'i (d. 808 AH / 1405 CE), Al-Najm Al-Wahhaj fi Sharh Al-Minhaj, Dar Al-Minhaj, 1st edition, 1425 AH - 2004 CE, vol. 6, p. 137.

Ibn Qudamah: Abu Muhammad Muwaffaq Al-Din Abdullah bin Ahmad bin Muhammad bin Qudamah Al-Jama'ili Al-Maqdisi, then Al-Dimashqi Al-Hanbali, known as Ibn Qudamah Al-Maqdisi (d. 620 AH / 1223 CE), Al-Kafi fi Fiqh Al-Imam Ahmad, Dar Al-Kutub Al-Ilmiyyah, 1st edition, 1414 AH - 1994 CE, vol. 3, p. 300.

[21] -Check:

Ibn Hazm: Abu Muhammad Ali bin Ahmad bin Sa'id bin Hazm Al-Andalusi Al-Qurtubi Al-Zahiri (d. 456 AH / 1063 CE), Al-Muhalla bil Athar, Beirut, Dar Al-Fikr, vol. 8, p. 353.

Al-Razi: Abu Abdullah Muhammad bin Umar bin Al-Hasan bin Al-Husayn Al-Taymi Al-Razi, known as Fakhr Al-Din Al-Razi, Khatib Al-Rayy (d. 606 AH / 1209 CE), Mafatih Al-Ghayb (Al-Tafsir Al-Kabir), Beirut, Dar Ihya’ Al-Turath Al-Arabi, 3rd edition, 1420 AH, vol. 5, p. 234.

[22] -Check:

Al-Zuhayli: Dr. Wahbah Al-Zuhayli, Al-Wasaya wal-Waqf fi Al-Fiqh Al-Islami, Damascus, Dar Al-Fikr, 1996 CE, p. 106.

[23] - Jordanian Personal Status Law No. (15) of 2019, Article No. (279).

[24] - Al-Kasani: Ala' Al-Din Abu Bakr bin Mas'ud bin Ahmad Al-Kasani Al-Hanafi (d. 587 AH / 1191 CE), Bada’i Al-Sana’i fi Tartib Al-Shara’i, Dar Al-Kutub Al-Ilmiyyah, 2nd edition, 1406 AH - 1986 CE, vol. 1, p. 311.

[25] - Alish: Muhammad bin Ahmad bin Muhammad Alish, Abu Abdullah Al-Maliki (d. 1299 AH / 1881 CE), Beirut, Dar Al-Fikr, 1409 AH / 1989 CE, vol. 1, p. 527.

[26] - Al-Juwayni: Abdul Malik bin Abdullah bin Yusuf bin Muhammad Al-Juwayni, Abu Al-Ma'ali, Rukn Al-Din, known as Imam Al-Haramayn (d. 478 AH / 1085 CE), Nihayat Al-Matlab fi Dirayat Al-Madhhab, edited and indexed by Prof. Dr. Abdul Azim Mahmoud Al-Deeb, Dar Al-Minhaj, 1st edition, 1428 AH - 2007 CE, vol. 3, p. 63.

[27] - Al-Ramli: Shams Al-Din Muhammad bin Abi Al-Abbas Ahmad bin Hamza Shihab Al-Din Al-Ramli (d. 1004 AH / 1595 CE), Nihayat Al-Muhtaj ila Sharh Al-Minhaj, Beirut, Dar Al-Fikr, 1404 AH / 1984 CE, Last edition, vol. 3, p. 23.

[28] -Check:

Al-Mardawi: Alaa’ Al-Din Abu Al-Hasan Ali bin Sulayman Al-Mardawi Al-Dimashqi Al-Salihi Al-Hanbali (d. 885 AH / 1480 CE), Al-Insaf fi Ma'rifat Al-Rajih min Al-Khilaf, Dar Ihya’ Al-Turath Al-Arabi, 2nd edition, vol. 2, p. 531.

[29] - Al-Bukhari: Sahih Al-Bukhari, Book of Funerals, Chapter on Prayer for the Deceased in the Prayer Ground and Mosque, Hadith No. 1263, vol. 1, p. 446.

[30] - Al-Shirbini: Shams Al-Din Muhammad bin Muhammad Al-Khatib Al-Shirbini (d. 977 AH), Mughni Al-Muhtaj, edited and annotated by Ali Muhammad Moawad - Adel Ahmad Abdel Mewgoud, Dar Al-Kutub Al-Ilmiyyah, 1st edition, 1415 AH / 1994 CE, vol. 2, p. 27.

[31] - Ibn Qudamah: Muwaffaq Al-Din Abu Muhammad Abdullah bin Ahmad bin Muhammad bin Qudamah Al-Maqdisi Al-Jama'iili Al-Dimashqi Al-Salihi Al-Hanbali (541-620 AH), Al-Mughni, edited by Dr. Abdullah bin Abdul Mohsin Al-Turki, Dr. Abdul Fattah Muhammad Al-Hilu, Dar Alam Al-Kutub for Printing, Publishing, and Distribution, Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 3rd edition, 1417 AH / 1997 CE, vol. 3, p. 446.

[32] - Ibn Abidin: Muhammad Amin, known as Ibn Abidin (d. 1252 AH), Hashiyat Ibn Abidin, published by Mustafa Al-Babi Al-Halabi and Sons, 2nd edition, 1386 AH / 1966 CE, reproduced by Dar Al-Fikr - Beirut, vol. 2, p. 209.

[33] - Al-Kharshi: Abu Abdullah Muhammad Al-Kharshi, Sharh Al-Kharshi on Mukhtasar Khalil, published by the Amiri Press, Egypt, 2nd edition, 1317 AH, reproduced by Dar Al-Fikr for Printing - Beirut, vol. 2, p. 142.