Articles

The Difference between Marriage (Nikāḥ) and Reinstatement (Rujʿah)
Author : Dr.Mosa Al-Zaa'tra
Date Added : 31-08-2025

The Difference between Marriage (Nikāḥ) and Reinstatement (Rujʿah) in Jordanian Personal Status Law

 

Marriage (Nikāḥ) and Reinstatement (Rujʿah) are two Islamic terms addressed in the Jordanian Personal Status Law. They differ in both form and ruling where each has its own set of conditions and corresponding juridical rulings within Islamic law.

As defined by the Jordanian Personal Status Law, Nikāḥ is: "A contract between a man and a woman who is lawfully permissible to him, for the purpose of forming a family and producing offspring." The marriage contract requires an offer (Ijāb) and acceptance (Qabūl) between the two parties, and the presence of witnesses is obligatory, as it entails legal and Sharia-based rights and duties related to the family, such as the rights of the wife and husband, establishment of lineage, the prohibition due to marital relations, inheritance, and others.

On the other hand, Rujʿah refers to the reinstatement of the wife into her husband’s marital authority after a revocable divorce (Talāq Rajʿī), without the need for a new contract.

Rujʿah provides an opportunity for the couple to reconcile and return to married life. It involves a waiting period known as the ʿIddah (waiting period after divorce). During this period, the couple remains bound by the marriage contract. If they decide to reunite before the end of the waiting period, married life can resume, reducing the number of divorces available to the husband as prescribed by Islamic law.

First: Definition of Rujʿah

A. Linguistically: The term Rujʿah is derived from Arjaʿa or Yurjiʿu, meaning "to return" or "to restore." The verb is transitive, and the object is Marjūʿ (restored) [1].

When a couple "Tarājaʿā," it means they returned to married life after divorce. Allah The Almighty Says (What means): "So if he has divorced her [for the third time], then she is not lawful to him afterward until she marries a husband other than him. And if the latter husband divorces her, there is no blame upon them for returning to each other." [Al-Baqarah/230].

B. Technically (in Islamic Jurisprudence):

Ḥanafīs define it as: "Rujʿah is the act of taking her back with the intention of retaining [the marriage]."[3].

Mālikīs define it as: "The return of the divorced woman to the marital authority without renewing the contract."[4].

Shāfiʿīs define it as: "Returning the woman to the marriage after a non-final divorce during the waiting period, in a specific manner."[5].

Ḥanbalīs define it as: "Reinstating a non-finally divorced woman to her previous status without a new contract."[6].

C. Definition in Law:

The Jordanian Personal Status Law defines it in Article (98):

"The husband has the right to reinstate his (revocable divorced wife) during the waiting period by word or action. This right is not forfeited by waiver, and reinstatement does not depend on the wife’s consent. No new dowry (Mahr) is required for it."

There is a legal distinction between the two terms in the Personal Status Law regarding guardianship, witnesses, consent, and formulation.

Second: Key Differences between Nikāḥ and Rujʿah

A. Regarding Guardianship (Wilāyah):

In Nikāḥ: A guardian is required, and he must be sane, mature, and Muslim if the bride is Muslim, as stated in Article (15) [7]. In Rujʿah: No guardian is required at all.

In Nikāḥ: Under Article (16), the consent of one guardian regarding the suitor overrules the objections of others if they are of equal degree. The consent of a more distant guardian in the absence of a closer one overrules the objection of the absent guardian. Implied consent is equivalent to explicit consent.

In Rujʿah: The guardian’s consent is not considered, as it is a right granted by Sharia. As stated in Article (98), the husband’s right to reinstatement does not require the wife’s consent.

In Nikāḥ: Under Article (17), if the closest guardian is absent and waiting for him would harm the bride’s interest, the right of guardianship transfers to the next in line. If consulting the next is impossible or he is unavailable, the right transfers to the judge.

In Rujʿah: The guardian’s absence has no effect.

In Nikāḥ: Under Article (18), if a guardian wrongfully prevents (ʿAthl) [8] the marriage of a virgin who has reached 16 solar years of age, the judge may authorize her marriage upon request.

In Rujʿah: It is forbidden for a guardian to prevent the husband from reinstating his wife as long as she is in the waiting period.

In Nikāḥ: Article (19) distinguishes between a virgin (Bikr) and a non-virgin (Thayyib) regarding the requirement of guardian consent: "The consent of a guardian is not required for the marriage of a sane, non-virgin woman who has reached eighteen years of age."

In Rujʿah: Guardian consent is not required, whether the woman is a virgin or non-virgin.

In Nikāḥ: Under Article (20), the judge’s authorization for marriage per Article (18) is conditional on the dowry not being less than the standard dowry (Mahr Al-Mithl).

In Rujʿah: There is no dowry.

B. Regarding Witnessing (Ishhād):

Witnesses are not required for Rujʿah, whether by word or action. However, the majority of jurists—Ḥanafīs, Mālikīs, Shāfiʿīs (in the new opinion), and Aḥmad (in one narration)—recommend having two just witnesses and informing the wife to avoid disputes and enable proof in case of denial.

In Nikāḥ: There is consensus on the requirement of multiple witnesses. [9].

C. Regarding Consent (Riḍā):

The fundamental difference lies in the role of consent:

In Nikāḥ: Consent is essential. [10]

In Rujʿah: Consent is not considered [11]. If the wife or her guardian refuses her return to the husband, this refusal has no effect on the reinstatement. In contrast, lack of consent in Nikāḥ invalidates the contract.

D. Regarding Formulation (Ṣīghah):

Nikāḥ must be conducted with explicit words, such as "Nikāḥ" or "Tazwīj." Rujʿah may be effected by words or actions [12].

In Nikāḥ: The consent of the wife and her guardian (if she is a virgin) or her consent alone (if she is non-virgin) is required.

In Rujʿah: In the case of a revocable divorce, the consent of neither the wife nor her guardian is required [13].

In Nikāḥ: Witnesses are obligatory.

In Rujʿah: The law does not require witnesses and remains silent on the matter [14].

These differences highlight the essential distinctions between Nikāḥ and Rujʿah in the Jordanian Personal Status Law. Nikāḥ is a contract between a man and a woman that requires a guardian, witnesses, a formal offer and acceptance, and the consent of both parties. Rujʿah, on the other hand, is the reinstatement of the wife into her husband’s marital authority after a revocable divorce by his unilateral will. It does not require a guardian, witnesses, or the wife’s consent as long as she is in the waiting period.

________________________________________

References:

[1] ʿAbd Al-Ḥamīd, Aḥmad Mukhtār, et al. (1429 AH). Muʿjam Al-Lughah Al-ʿArabīyah Al-Muʿāṣirah (1st ed. /Vol.2/pp.860). ʿĀlam Al-Kutub.

[2] Qur’an, [Al-Baqarah/230].

[3] Al-Kāsānī, Abū Bakr Ibn Masʿūd. [Badāʾiʿ Al-Ṣanāʾiʿ Fī Tartīb Al-Sharāʾiʿ/Vol.2/pp.330].

[4] Al-Dasūqī, Muḥammad Ibn Aḥmad. [Ḥāshiyat Al-Dasūqī ʿAlā Al-Shariḥ Al-Kabīr/Vol.2/pp.415].

[5] Al-Shirbīnī. [Mughnī Al-Muḥtāj Ilā Maʿrifat Maʿānī Alfāẓ Al-Minhāj/Vol.5/pp.3].

[6] Abū Al-Najā, Mūsā Ibn Aḥmad. [Al-Iqnāʿ Fī Fiqh/Al-Imām Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal/Vol.4/pp.560]. Ed. ʿAbd Al-Laṭīf Muḥammad Mūsā Al-Subkī. Dār Al-Maʿrifah.

[7] Jordanian Personal Status Law/Article/15.

[8] Definition of ʿAthl (prevention).

[9] Juristic references: Al-Kāsānī [Badāʾiʿ Al-Ṣanāʾiʿ; Al-Numayrī, Al-Kāfī Fī Fiqh Ahl Al-Madīnah]; Al-ʿĀṣimī, [Ḥāshiyat Al-Rawḍ Al-Murabbaʿ].

[10] Jordanian Personal Status Law, Article 16.

[11] Jordanian Personal Status Law, Article 98.

[12] Jordanian Personal Status Law, Article 7.

[13] Jordanian Personal Status Law, Article 98.

[14] Jordanian Personal Status Law, Article 8(A).

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Summarized Fatawaa

Is it permissible for someone who is unable to fast to pay the fidyah (ransom/compensation payment) to himself, due to his own poverty?

All praise is due to Allah, and peace and blessings be upon our master, the Messenger of Allah ﷺ.
It is not permissible, nor does it fulfill the obligation, for a sick person who is currently and permanently unable to fast to pay the fidyah (ransom/compensation payment) to himself, since it is a financial obligation owed by him, established as a standing debt upon him — much like any other debt he owes. If he were to pay it to himself, it would not thereby be discharged. So if he cannot find [anyone eligible to] pay it to, it remains a standing obligation upon him, and is not thereby waived. If Allah, the Mighty and Majestic, later grants him wealth, it becomes obligatory upon him to pay it out to the poor and needy.
Imam al-Khaṭīb ash-Shirbīnī (raḥimahullāh) said: "There is no difference in the obligation of the fidyah between the wealthy and the poor person; its benefit lies in its remaining established as a standing debt upon the poor person [until he is able to pay it] — and this is the more correct position (al-aṣaḥḥ), as indicated by the wording of ar-Rawḍah and its source text." [Mughnī al-Muḥtāj, Vol.2/P.174]
Accordingly: it is not permissible for a Muslim to pay the fidyah to himself while he remains poor. If the sick person is poor, he is not obligated to pay the fidyah immediately, and it remains a standing debt upon him until a time when he has sufficient means and wealth. And Allah, the Exalted, knows best.

Can a person required to give kaffarah feed it to their own family members?

The kaffarah must be given to the poor and needy who are not financially dependent on the one giving the kaffarah.
If a person feeds it to their own family members, it does not count as kaffarah, and their obligation remains unfulfilled.

If the bleeding ceases after 40 days following childbirth, but then returns intermittently during two days of fasting, what is the ruling?

 
Praise be to Allah, and peace and blessings be upon our Master, the Messenger of Allah.
 
Whenever the post-natal bleeding (Nifas) ceases and the woman is certain it will not return, she has become pure; therefore, she must perform the ritual bath (Ghusl) and resume praying and fasting. However, if the blood returns within fifteen days of its cessation and before sixty days have passed since the delivery, the ruling of Nifas applies once again. Consequently, any fasting or prayer performed during that interval of purity is rendered invalid; she must make up for the missed fasts of those days, but she is not required to make up for the prayers. And Allah the Exalted knows best.

What is the ruling on combining (jam‘) and shortening (qaṣr) prayers when travel is repeated on a daily basis?

All praise is due to Allah, and peace and blessings be upon our master, the Messenger of Allah ﷺ.
A traveler is permitted to avail himself of the concessions of shortening and combining prayers once the distance of his journey reaches (81 km) or more. This is on condition that his journey is a permissible one, and that he begins shortening and combining only after setting out and passing beyond the built-up limits of the city in which he resides, or beyond the administrative boundaries of the area where he lives.
Accordingly, if the distance between one's workplace and one's place of residence reaches the distance upon which the concession of combining and shortening depends, then combining and shortening are permissible once he leaves the built-up area, even if this travel is repeated on a daily basis.
Ash-Shirbīnī (raḥimahullāh) said: "It is permissible to combine Ẓuhr and ‘Aṣr, either as an early combination (taqdīm) in the time of the first, or as a delayed combination (ta'khīr) in the time of the second; and likewise Maghrib and ‘Ishā' — either early, in the time of the first, or delayed, in the time of the second — during a long, permissible journey, in following [the Prophet's practice]. As for the delayed combination, it is established in the two Ṣaḥīḥs from the ḥadīth of Anas and Ibn ‘Umar (raḍiyallāhu ‘anhum). As for the early combination, Ibn Ḥibbān and al-Bayhaqī graded it ṣaḥīḥ from the ḥadīth of Mu‘ādh, and at-Tirmidhī graded it ḥasan." [Quoted with slight abridgment from Mughnī al-Muḥtāj, Vol.1/p.529]
The conditions for combining and shortening have already been explained in Fatwa No. 14 and Fatwa No. 842. And Allah, the Exalted, knows best.