Articles

The Difference between Marriage (Nikāḥ) and Reinstatement (Rujʿah)
Author : Dr.Mosa Al-Zaa'tra
Date Added : 31-08-2025

The Difference between Marriage (Nikāḥ) and Reinstatement (Rujʿah) in Jordanian Personal Status Law

 

Marriage (Nikāḥ) and Reinstatement (Rujʿah) are two Islamic terms addressed in the Jordanian Personal Status Law. They differ in both form and ruling where each has its own set of conditions and corresponding juridical rulings within Islamic law.

As defined by the Jordanian Personal Status Law, Nikāḥ is: "A contract between a man and a woman who is lawfully permissible to him, for the purpose of forming a family and producing offspring." The marriage contract requires an offer (Ijāb) and acceptance (Qabūl) between the two parties, and the presence of witnesses is obligatory, as it entails legal and Sharia-based rights and duties related to the family, such as the rights of the wife and husband, establishment of lineage, the prohibition due to marital relations, inheritance, and others.

On the other hand, Rujʿah refers to the reinstatement of the wife into her husband’s marital authority after a revocable divorce (Talāq Rajʿī), without the need for a new contract.

Rujʿah provides an opportunity for the couple to reconcile and return to married life. It involves a waiting period known as the ʿIddah (waiting period after divorce). During this period, the couple remains bound by the marriage contract. If they decide to reunite before the end of the waiting period, married life can resume, reducing the number of divorces available to the husband as prescribed by Islamic law.

First: Definition of Rujʿah

A. Linguistically: The term Rujʿah is derived from Arjaʿa or Yurjiʿu, meaning "to return" or "to restore." The verb is transitive, and the object is Marjūʿ (restored) [1].

When a couple "Tarājaʿā," it means they returned to married life after divorce. Allah The Almighty Says (What means): "So if he has divorced her [for the third time], then she is not lawful to him afterward until she marries a husband other than him. And if the latter husband divorces her, there is no blame upon them for returning to each other." [Al-Baqarah/230].

B. Technically (in Islamic Jurisprudence):

Ḥanafīs define it as: "Rujʿah is the act of taking her back with the intention of retaining [the marriage]."[3].

Mālikīs define it as: "The return of the divorced woman to the marital authority without renewing the contract."[4].

Shāfiʿīs define it as: "Returning the woman to the marriage after a non-final divorce during the waiting period, in a specific manner."[5].

Ḥanbalīs define it as: "Reinstating a non-finally divorced woman to her previous status without a new contract."[6].

C. Definition in Law:

The Jordanian Personal Status Law defines it in Article (98):

"The husband has the right to reinstate his (revocable divorced wife) during the waiting period by word or action. This right is not forfeited by waiver, and reinstatement does not depend on the wife’s consent. No new dowry (Mahr) is required for it."

There is a legal distinction between the two terms in the Personal Status Law regarding guardianship, witnesses, consent, and formulation.

Second: Key Differences between Nikāḥ and Rujʿah

A. Regarding Guardianship (Wilāyah):

In Nikāḥ: A guardian is required, and he must be sane, mature, and Muslim if the bride is Muslim, as stated in Article (15) [7]. In Rujʿah: No guardian is required at all.

In Nikāḥ: Under Article (16), the consent of one guardian regarding the suitor overrules the objections of others if they are of equal degree. The consent of a more distant guardian in the absence of a closer one overrules the objection of the absent guardian. Implied consent is equivalent to explicit consent.

In Rujʿah: The guardian’s consent is not considered, as it is a right granted by Sharia. As stated in Article (98), the husband’s right to reinstatement does not require the wife’s consent.

In Nikāḥ: Under Article (17), if the closest guardian is absent and waiting for him would harm the bride’s interest, the right of guardianship transfers to the next in line. If consulting the next is impossible or he is unavailable, the right transfers to the judge.

In Rujʿah: The guardian’s absence has no effect.

In Nikāḥ: Under Article (18), if a guardian wrongfully prevents (ʿAthl) [8] the marriage of a virgin who has reached 16 solar years of age, the judge may authorize her marriage upon request.

In Rujʿah: It is forbidden for a guardian to prevent the husband from reinstating his wife as long as she is in the waiting period.

In Nikāḥ: Article (19) distinguishes between a virgin (Bikr) and a non-virgin (Thayyib) regarding the requirement of guardian consent: "The consent of a guardian is not required for the marriage of a sane, non-virgin woman who has reached eighteen years of age."

In Rujʿah: Guardian consent is not required, whether the woman is a virgin or non-virgin.

In Nikāḥ: Under Article (20), the judge’s authorization for marriage per Article (18) is conditional on the dowry not being less than the standard dowry (Mahr Al-Mithl).

In Rujʿah: There is no dowry.

B. Regarding Witnessing (Ishhād):

Witnesses are not required for Rujʿah, whether by word or action. However, the majority of jurists—Ḥanafīs, Mālikīs, Shāfiʿīs (in the new opinion), and Aḥmad (in one narration)—recommend having two just witnesses and informing the wife to avoid disputes and enable proof in case of denial.

In Nikāḥ: There is consensus on the requirement of multiple witnesses. [9].

C. Regarding Consent (Riḍā):

The fundamental difference lies in the role of consent:

In Nikāḥ: Consent is essential. [10]

In Rujʿah: Consent is not considered [11]. If the wife or her guardian refuses her return to the husband, this refusal has no effect on the reinstatement. In contrast, lack of consent in Nikāḥ invalidates the contract.

D. Regarding Formulation (Ṣīghah):

Nikāḥ must be conducted with explicit words, such as "Nikāḥ" or "Tazwīj." Rujʿah may be effected by words or actions [12].

In Nikāḥ: The consent of the wife and her guardian (if she is a virgin) or her consent alone (if she is non-virgin) is required.

In Rujʿah: In the case of a revocable divorce, the consent of neither the wife nor her guardian is required [13].

In Nikāḥ: Witnesses are obligatory.

In Rujʿah: The law does not require witnesses and remains silent on the matter [14].

These differences highlight the essential distinctions between Nikāḥ and Rujʿah in the Jordanian Personal Status Law. Nikāḥ is a contract between a man and a woman that requires a guardian, witnesses, a formal offer and acceptance, and the consent of both parties. Rujʿah, on the other hand, is the reinstatement of the wife into her husband’s marital authority after a revocable divorce by his unilateral will. It does not require a guardian, witnesses, or the wife’s consent as long as she is in the waiting period.

________________________________________

References:

[1] ʿAbd Al-Ḥamīd, Aḥmad Mukhtār, et al. (1429 AH). Muʿjam Al-Lughah Al-ʿArabīyah Al-Muʿāṣirah (1st ed. /Vol.2/pp.860). ʿĀlam Al-Kutub.

[2] Qur’an, [Al-Baqarah/230].

[3] Al-Kāsānī, Abū Bakr Ibn Masʿūd. [Badāʾiʿ Al-Ṣanāʾiʿ Fī Tartīb Al-Sharāʾiʿ/Vol.2/pp.330].

[4] Al-Dasūqī, Muḥammad Ibn Aḥmad. [Ḥāshiyat Al-Dasūqī ʿAlā Al-Shariḥ Al-Kabīr/Vol.2/pp.415].

[5] Al-Shirbīnī. [Mughnī Al-Muḥtāj Ilā Maʿrifat Maʿānī Alfāẓ Al-Minhāj/Vol.5/pp.3].

[6] Abū Al-Najā, Mūsā Ibn Aḥmad. [Al-Iqnāʿ Fī Fiqh/Al-Imām Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal/Vol.4/pp.560]. Ed. ʿAbd Al-Laṭīf Muḥammad Mūsā Al-Subkī. Dār Al-Maʿrifah.

[7] Jordanian Personal Status Law/Article/15.

[8] Definition of ʿAthl (prevention).

[9] Juristic references: Al-Kāsānī [Badāʾiʿ Al-Ṣanāʾiʿ; Al-Numayrī, Al-Kāfī Fī Fiqh Ahl Al-Madīnah]; Al-ʿĀṣimī, [Ḥāshiyat Al-Rawḍ Al-Murabbaʿ].

[10] Jordanian Personal Status Law, Article 16.

[11] Jordanian Personal Status Law, Article 98.

[12] Jordanian Personal Status Law, Article 7.

[13] Jordanian Personal Status Law, Article 98.

[14] Jordanian Personal Status Law, Article 8(A).

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Summarized Fatawaa

What is the ruling of Islamic Law regarding one who slaughters a ewe and it turns out to have been pregnant, and is it permissible to slaughter the ewe if one knows it is pregnant?

Praise be to Allah, and peace and blessings upon our master, the Messenger of Allah.
If a person slaughters a ewe and it turns out to have been pregnant, the fetus becomes lawful (ḥalāl) by virtue of its mother's slaughter (tabaʿan li-ummihā).
It is stated in Mughnī al-Muḥtāj (Vol.6/P.158): "A fetus found dead [after the mother's slaughter], or found alive but in a state resembling that of a slaughtered animal [i.e., dying shortly after], becomes lawful — whether or not it had grown fur — provided it is found in the womb of a mother that was lawfully slaughtered, whether her slaughter was by cutting the throat, or by an arrow or hunting dog sent after her. This is based on the ḥadīth: 'The slaughtering of the fetus is [effected by] the slaughtering of its mother' [narrated by al-Tirmidhī, who graded it ḥasan, and by Ibn Ḥibbān, who graded it ṣaḥīḥ] — meaning that the slaughter which rendered the mother lawful renders the fetus lawful as well, by virtue of following her; and because the fetus is one of her constituent parts, and her slaughter renders lawful all of her parts."
This ruling differs, however, from the case of one who knows from the outset that the ewe is pregnant [and intends to sacrifice her specifically as the udḥiyah while pregnant] — in which case, according to the Shāfi'ī school, she does not fulfill the requirement of a valid sacrifice.
It is stated in Ḥāshiyat al-Bujayrimī 'alā al-Khaṭīb (Vol.4/P.335): "A pregnant animal does not fulfill the requirement [of a valid sacrifice], and this is the authoritative position (al-mu'tamad), because pregnancy diminishes the quality of the meat. As for why such an animal is nevertheless counted as complete [i.e., fully valid] in matters of zakāh, that is because the intent there is reproduction (nasl), not the quality of the meat.". And Allah, the Most High, knows best.

What is the ruling on forgiving a tenant next month's rent, with the intention of counting it toward zakāh al-māl?

All praise is due to Allah, and peace and blessings be upon our master, the Messenger of Allah ﷺ.
It does not fulfill the obligation to count the rent owed on a house, or a portion of it, in lieu of zakāh. Rather, it is necessary to first transfer ownership of the zakāh amount to the poor person directly; only afterward may he be asked to pay the rent [from that money].
It is stated in ‘Umdat as-Sālik (p. 112): "If someone gives [money] to a poor person, stipulating that the recipient return it to him in payment of a debt owed to him, or says, 'I am making what you owe me into zakāh, so take it [as such]' — this is not valid. But if he gives it to him with the [unstated] intention that the recipient will use it to repay him, or says, 'Repay what you owe me, so that I may [then separately] give it to you as zakāh,' or the debtor himself says, 'Give it to me, so that I may [then] repay you with it' — this is valid, and there is no binding obligation for the recipient to actually fulfill this [informal understanding]."
We would also remind [the reader] of the ḥadīth of the Prophet ﷺ: "The Muslim is the brother of the Muslim: he does not wrong him, nor does he abandon him [to harm]. Whoever attends to the needs of his brother, Allah, the Mighty and Majestic, will attend to his needs. Whoever relieves a Muslim of a hardship, Allah, the Mighty and Majestic, will relieve him of one of the hardships of the Day of Resurrection. And whoever conceals [the faults of] a Muslim, Allah will conceal him on the Day of Resurrection." (Agreed upon). And Allah, the Exalted, knows best.

What is the ruling of Islamic Law regarding one who purchases a sacrificial animal (uḍḥiyah) and it then develops a defect before slaughter?

Praise be to Allah, and peace and blessings upon our master, the Messenger of Allah.
If a defect that invalidates the sacrifice (uḍḥiyah) arises after its purchase — for example, if one purchased a sound, defect-free animal, and it then developed a limp, blindness in one eye, or a similar defect before slaughter — it does not fulfill the requirement of a valid uḍḥiyah, according to the Shāfi'ī school.
It is stated in Asnā al-Maṭālib fī Sharḥ Rawḍ al-Ṭālib (Vol.1/P.535): "Even if the limp develops [in the animal] while the knife is upon it, it still does not fulfill the requirement, because it is lame at the moment of slaughter — this is analogous to a case where a sheep's leg breaks and one hastens to slaughter it [in that condition]."
The Ḥanbalī school, however, held that if the one offering the sacrifice purchased the animal while it was sound and defect-free, and a defect then befell it afterward, the sacrifice remains valid and there is no obligation to replace it.
It is stated in Masā'il al-Imām Aḥmad, one of the Ḥanbalī reference works (Vol.8/P.4021): "I said: If a person purchases the sacrificial animal while it is sound, and it is then afflicted with illness, blindness in one eye, or a broken limb [before slaughter]? He [Imam Aḥmad] said: It is said that it still fulfills the requirement. Isḥāq said likewise, because he purchased it while sound, and the defect befell it only afterward, so it remains sufficient on his behalf." [End of quote]
Accordingly, a sheep afflicted with a defect that invalidates the sacrifice does not fulfill the requirement of a valid uḍḥiyah — whether the defect arose after purchase or during the slaughter itself — according to the Shāfi'ī school. However, there is no objection to following the Ḥanbalī position on this matter [as a valid alternative]. And Allah, the Most High, knows best.

What is the ruling on someone who is uncertain whether he omitted one of the ab‘āḍ of the prayer, such as being uncertain whether he omitted the first tashahhud?

All praise is due to Allah, and peace and blessings be upon our master, the Messenger of Allah ﷺ.
The ab‘āḍ include the middle tashahhud and the qunūt in Fajr prayer — for which sujūd as-sahw (the prostration of forgetfulness) is prescribed if left out. Whoever is uncertain, during the prayer, whether he omitted one of these elements, should proceed on the assumption that he did not perform it, and should perform sujūd as-sahw accordingly.
It is stated in ‘Umdat as-Sālik (p. 63): "If he is uncertain... whether he omitted a specific ab‘āḍ element, or whether he performed sujūd as-sahw, or whether he prayed three or four rak‘ahs — he proceeds on the assumption that he did not do it, and performs sujūd as-sahw."
The original principle (al-aṣl) for someone uncertain about [having performed] the first tashahhud is that he assumes he did not perform it. And Allah, the Exalted, knows best.