Articles

The Difference between Marriage (Nikāḥ) and Reinstatement (Rujʿah)
Author : Dr.Mosa Al-Zaa'tra
Date Added : 31-08-2025

The Difference between Marriage (Nikāḥ) and Reinstatement (Rujʿah) in Jordanian Personal Status Law

 

Marriage (Nikāḥ) and Reinstatement (Rujʿah) are two Islamic terms addressed in the Jordanian Personal Status Law. They differ in both form and ruling where each has its own set of conditions and corresponding juridical rulings within Islamic law.

As defined by the Jordanian Personal Status Law, Nikāḥ is: "A contract between a man and a woman who is lawfully permissible to him, for the purpose of forming a family and producing offspring." The marriage contract requires an offer (Ijāb) and acceptance (Qabūl) between the two parties, and the presence of witnesses is obligatory, as it entails legal and Sharia-based rights and duties related to the family, such as the rights of the wife and husband, establishment of lineage, the prohibition due to marital relations, inheritance, and others.

On the other hand, Rujʿah refers to the reinstatement of the wife into her husband’s marital authority after a revocable divorce (Talāq Rajʿī), without the need for a new contract.

Rujʿah provides an opportunity for the couple to reconcile and return to married life. It involves a waiting period known as the ʿIddah (waiting period after divorce). During this period, the couple remains bound by the marriage contract. If they decide to reunite before the end of the waiting period, married life can resume, reducing the number of divorces available to the husband as prescribed by Islamic law.

First: Definition of Rujʿah

A. Linguistically: The term Rujʿah is derived from Arjaʿa or Yurjiʿu, meaning "to return" or "to restore." The verb is transitive, and the object is Marjūʿ (restored) [1].

When a couple "Tarājaʿā," it means they returned to married life after divorce. Allah The Almighty Says (What means): "So if he has divorced her [for the third time], then she is not lawful to him afterward until she marries a husband other than him. And if the latter husband divorces her, there is no blame upon them for returning to each other." [Al-Baqarah/230].

B. Technically (in Islamic Jurisprudence):

Ḥanafīs define it as: "Rujʿah is the act of taking her back with the intention of retaining [the marriage]."[3].

Mālikīs define it as: "The return of the divorced woman to the marital authority without renewing the contract."[4].

Shāfiʿīs define it as: "Returning the woman to the marriage after a non-final divorce during the waiting period, in a specific manner."[5].

Ḥanbalīs define it as: "Reinstating a non-finally divorced woman to her previous status without a new contract."[6].

C. Definition in Law:

The Jordanian Personal Status Law defines it in Article (98):

"The husband has the right to reinstate his (revocable divorced wife) during the waiting period by word or action. This right is not forfeited by waiver, and reinstatement does not depend on the wife’s consent. No new dowry (Mahr) is required for it."

There is a legal distinction between the two terms in the Personal Status Law regarding guardianship, witnesses, consent, and formulation.

Second: Key Differences between Nikāḥ and Rujʿah

A. Regarding Guardianship (Wilāyah):

In Nikāḥ: A guardian is required, and he must be sane, mature, and Muslim if the bride is Muslim, as stated in Article (15) [7]. In Rujʿah: No guardian is required at all.

In Nikāḥ: Under Article (16), the consent of one guardian regarding the suitor overrules the objections of others if they are of equal degree. The consent of a more distant guardian in the absence of a closer one overrules the objection of the absent guardian. Implied consent is equivalent to explicit consent.

In Rujʿah: The guardian’s consent is not considered, as it is a right granted by Sharia. As stated in Article (98), the husband’s right to reinstatement does not require the wife’s consent.

In Nikāḥ: Under Article (17), if the closest guardian is absent and waiting for him would harm the bride’s interest, the right of guardianship transfers to the next in line. If consulting the next is impossible or he is unavailable, the right transfers to the judge.

In Rujʿah: The guardian’s absence has no effect.

In Nikāḥ: Under Article (18), if a guardian wrongfully prevents (ʿAthl) [8] the marriage of a virgin who has reached 16 solar years of age, the judge may authorize her marriage upon request.

In Rujʿah: It is forbidden for a guardian to prevent the husband from reinstating his wife as long as she is in the waiting period.

In Nikāḥ: Article (19) distinguishes between a virgin (Bikr) and a non-virgin (Thayyib) regarding the requirement of guardian consent: "The consent of a guardian is not required for the marriage of a sane, non-virgin woman who has reached eighteen years of age."

In Rujʿah: Guardian consent is not required, whether the woman is a virgin or non-virgin.

In Nikāḥ: Under Article (20), the judge’s authorization for marriage per Article (18) is conditional on the dowry not being less than the standard dowry (Mahr Al-Mithl).

In Rujʿah: There is no dowry.

B. Regarding Witnessing (Ishhād):

Witnesses are not required for Rujʿah, whether by word or action. However, the majority of jurists—Ḥanafīs, Mālikīs, Shāfiʿīs (in the new opinion), and Aḥmad (in one narration)—recommend having two just witnesses and informing the wife to avoid disputes and enable proof in case of denial.

In Nikāḥ: There is consensus on the requirement of multiple witnesses. [9].

C. Regarding Consent (Riḍā):

The fundamental difference lies in the role of consent:

In Nikāḥ: Consent is essential. [10]

In Rujʿah: Consent is not considered [11]. If the wife or her guardian refuses her return to the husband, this refusal has no effect on the reinstatement. In contrast, lack of consent in Nikāḥ invalidates the contract.

D. Regarding Formulation (Ṣīghah):

Nikāḥ must be conducted with explicit words, such as "Nikāḥ" or "Tazwīj." Rujʿah may be effected by words or actions [12].

In Nikāḥ: The consent of the wife and her guardian (if she is a virgin) or her consent alone (if she is non-virgin) is required.

In Rujʿah: In the case of a revocable divorce, the consent of neither the wife nor her guardian is required [13].

In Nikāḥ: Witnesses are obligatory.

In Rujʿah: The law does not require witnesses and remains silent on the matter [14].

These differences highlight the essential distinctions between Nikāḥ and Rujʿah in the Jordanian Personal Status Law. Nikāḥ is a contract between a man and a woman that requires a guardian, witnesses, a formal offer and acceptance, and the consent of both parties. Rujʿah, on the other hand, is the reinstatement of the wife into her husband’s marital authority after a revocable divorce by his unilateral will. It does not require a guardian, witnesses, or the wife’s consent as long as she is in the waiting period.

________________________________________

References:

[1] ʿAbd Al-Ḥamīd, Aḥmad Mukhtār, et al. (1429 AH). Muʿjam Al-Lughah Al-ʿArabīyah Al-Muʿāṣirah (1st ed. /Vol.2/pp.860). ʿĀlam Al-Kutub.

[2] Qur’an, [Al-Baqarah/230].

[3] Al-Kāsānī, Abū Bakr Ibn Masʿūd. [Badāʾiʿ Al-Ṣanāʾiʿ Fī Tartīb Al-Sharāʾiʿ/Vol.2/pp.330].

[4] Al-Dasūqī, Muḥammad Ibn Aḥmad. [Ḥāshiyat Al-Dasūqī ʿAlā Al-Shariḥ Al-Kabīr/Vol.2/pp.415].

[5] Al-Shirbīnī. [Mughnī Al-Muḥtāj Ilā Maʿrifat Maʿānī Alfāẓ Al-Minhāj/Vol.5/pp.3].

[6] Abū Al-Najā, Mūsā Ibn Aḥmad. [Al-Iqnāʿ Fī Fiqh/Al-Imām Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal/Vol.4/pp.560]. Ed. ʿAbd Al-Laṭīf Muḥammad Mūsā Al-Subkī. Dār Al-Maʿrifah.

[7] Jordanian Personal Status Law/Article/15.

[8] Definition of ʿAthl (prevention).

[9] Juristic references: Al-Kāsānī [Badāʾiʿ Al-Ṣanāʾiʿ; Al-Numayrī, Al-Kāfī Fī Fiqh Ahl Al-Madīnah]; Al-ʿĀṣimī, [Ḥāshiyat Al-Rawḍ Al-Murabbaʿ].

[10] Jordanian Personal Status Law, Article 16.

[11] Jordanian Personal Status Law, Article 98.

[12] Jordanian Personal Status Law, Article 7.

[13] Jordanian Personal Status Law, Article 98.

[14] Jordanian Personal Status Law, Article 8(A).

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Summarized Fatawaa

What is the ruling of Islamic Law regarding one who purchases a sacrificial animal (uḍḥiyah) and it then develops a defect before slaughter?

Praise be to Allah, and peace and blessings upon our master, the Messenger of Allah.
If a defect that invalidates the sacrifice (uḍḥiyah) arises after its purchase — for example, if one purchased a sound, defect-free animal, and it then developed a limp, blindness in one eye, or a similar defect before slaughter — it does not fulfill the requirement of a valid uḍḥiyah, according to the Shāfi'ī school.
It is stated in Asnā al-Maṭālib fī Sharḥ Rawḍ al-Ṭālib (Vol.1/P.535): "Even if the limp develops [in the animal] while the knife is upon it, it still does not fulfill the requirement, because it is lame at the moment of slaughter — this is analogous to a case where a sheep's leg breaks and one hastens to slaughter it [in that condition]."
The Ḥanbalī school, however, held that if the one offering the sacrifice purchased the animal while it was sound and defect-free, and a defect then befell it afterward, the sacrifice remains valid and there is no obligation to replace it.
It is stated in Masā'il al-Imām Aḥmad, one of the Ḥanbalī reference works (Vol.8/P.4021): "I said: If a person purchases the sacrificial animal while it is sound, and it is then afflicted with illness, blindness in one eye, or a broken limb [before slaughter]? He [Imam Aḥmad] said: It is said that it still fulfills the requirement. Isḥāq said likewise, because he purchased it while sound, and the defect befell it only afterward, so it remains sufficient on his behalf." [End of quote]
Accordingly, a sheep afflicted with a defect that invalidates the sacrifice does not fulfill the requirement of a valid uḍḥiyah — whether the defect arose after purchase or during the slaughter itself — according to the Shāfi'ī school. However, there is no objection to following the Ḥanbalī position on this matter [as a valid alternative]. And Allah, the Most High, knows best.

What is the ruling of Islamic Law on performing ṭawāf on the upper floors of al-Masjid al-Ḥarām, given that these floors are situated above the level of the Ka‘bah, and that the one performing ṭawāf passes by certain barriers, such as pillars and walls, during the ṭawāf?

All praise is due to Allah, and peace and blessings be upon our master, the Messenger of Allah ﷺ.
There are numerous conditions for the validity of ṭawāf (circumambulation around the Ka‘bah), among them: that the one performing ṭawāf be inside the Masjid (al-Masjid al-Ḥarām) — even if the Masjid has been expanded, so long as the expansion does not extend out into al-ḥill (land outside the sanctuary boundaries). It suffices for the ṭawāf to be performed in the airspace of the Masjid or upon its roof, even if that roof is higher than the Ka‘bah (the House) itself.
Al-Khaṭīb ash-Shirbīnī (raḥimahullāh) said: "It [ṭawāf] is valid upon the roof of the Masjid, even if the roof of the Masjid is higher than the House — just as prayer [is valid] upon Mount Abū Qubays despite its elevation above the House. This is the relied-upon (mu‘tamad) position." [Mughnī al-Muḥtāj, Vol.2/P.246]
The validity of the tawaf isn`t affected by the pillars and walls standing between the one performing ṭawāf and the House, since the condition is only that the person performing ṭawāf be within the boundaries of the Masjid and outside the boundaries of the Ka‘bah itself.
Ash-Shirbīnī said: "It [ṭawāf] is valid inside the Masjid, even if it is expanded, and even if a barrier stands between the one circumambulating and the House — such as a water-supply structure (saqāyah) or pillars (sawārī)." [Mughnī al-Muḥtāj, Vol. 2/P.246]
Accordingly, ṭawāf performed on the upper floors is valid, and the presence of barriers such as pillars and walls during the ṭawāf does not affect its validity. And Allah, the Exalted, knows best.

What is the ruling on congregational prayer performed outside the mosque, and is it a condition that it be performed in a mosque in order to attain the full reward?

All praise is due to Allah, and peace and blessings be upon our master, the Messenger of Allah ﷺ.
It is not a condition for attaining the reward of congregational prayer that it be performed in a mosque; however, a Muslim should still be keen to perform his prayers in the mosque, so as not to miss out on immense reward. This is due to the virtue of the mosque and of spending time there (i‘tikāf), the typically larger number of worshippers present, and the additional reward gained through walking to and from the mosque. On the authority of Abū Hurayrah (raḍiyallāhu ‘anh), the Messenger of Allah ﷺ said: "Whoever purifies himself in his house, then walks to one of the houses of Allah to fulfill one of the obligations Allah has prescribed, one of his steps will erase a sin, and the other will raise him a degree [in status]." (Related by Muslim)
Whoever misses congregational prayer at the mosque should still strive to pray in congregation at his workplace, or together with the members of his household. And Allah, the Exalted, knows best.

What is the ruling of Islamic Law on one who died owing debts and left no wealth? Is it obligatory upon the heirs to settle these debts?

 

All praise is due to Allah, and peace and blessings be upon our master, the Messenger of Allah.
The general rule is that if a person dies owing rights to other people, such as debts, these are settled from his estate, if he left any wealth, before the estate is divided. The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said: “The believer's soul is suspended by his debt until it is settled for him.” Graded ḥasan by al-Tirmidhī. Repayment of debts takes precedence over the heirs’ right to inheritance.
If the deceased left no estate, or left wealth that was insufficient to cover his debts, it is not obligatory for the heirs to pay from their own wealth, but it is recommended for them to do so, because the deceased’s dhimmah (legal liability) remains occupied by the debt. It is reported in some narrations that he remains held in suspension until his debt is paid, and it is not part of filial righteousness for a child to leave his father’s dhimmah burdened with debt.
All of the children may contribute to settling the debt on behalf of their father and cooperate in doing so, even in installments, according to their ability. And Allah Almighty knows best.