What is the ruling on someone who possesses gold with the intention of saving/hoarding it, and owns nothing else — is he obligated to sell a portion of it in order to pay the zakāh due on it?
All praise is due to Allah, and peace and blessings be upon our master, the Messenger of Allah ﷺ.
Zakāh becomes immediately obligatory on cash, and likewise on gold — that which is not designated for a woman's personal adornment— once both reach the niṣāb (minimum threshold liable for zakah) and a full ḥawl (lunar year) has passed over them. It is not permissible to delay payment when it is genuinely possible to pay — meaning, when the wealth and the eligible recipients are both available. It is stated in Mughnī al-Muḥtāj (Vol.2/p.129): "Zakāh is obligatory immediately once it becomes feasible to pay it, meaning when the wealth and the eligible recipients are both present."
The one paying zakāh must discharge the obligatory zakāh due on saved (hoarded) gold either from the gold itself, or from its equivalent monetary value, in the event that no other funds are available — since paying from the gold itself is the original default (al-aṣl). It becomes permissible to pay from other funds instead only because zakāh is built upon the principle of ease and leniency, as stated in Asnā al-Maṭālib (Vol.1/p.366): "When a full ḥawl has elapsed on wealth other than trade goods... zakāh attaches to the actual asset itself (al-‘ayn), and the poor effectively become partners in it — even, for example, [becoming partners] in camels through the value of a sheep [owed as zakāh on them]... Paying from other wealth is permitted only because zakāh is built upon the principle of ease and leniency."
Accordingly: the one paying zakāh must discharge it either from the actual saved gold itself, or by selling a portion of the gold equal to the amount of zakāh owed. He may also borrow money to pay the zakāh, or pay the zakāh in installments before the ḥawl is complete [as an advance payment]. And Allah, the Exalted, knows best.
The Jurisprudential Significance of the Ḥadīth: "Whoever says, at the conclusion of the Fajr Prayer, while crossing his legs, before speaking..."
"Whoever says, at the conclusion of the Fajr prayer, while crossing his legs, before speaking: 'Lā ilāha illā Allāh, waḥdahu lā sharīka lah, lahu al-mulku wa lahu al-ḥamdu yuḥyī wa yumītu wa huwa ʿalā kulli shayʾin qadīr' ten times — ten good deeds will be recorded for him, ten bad deeds will be erased from him, he will be raised ten levels, he will spend that day in protection from everything disliked and guarded from the devil, and no sin will be able to befall him on that day except associating partners with Allah" — does this noble ḥadīth apply to the imam, and what is meant by "extraneous speech"?
All praise is due to Allah, and peace and blessings be upon our master the Messenger of Allah ﷺ.
It is recommended for both the imam and those praying behind him to recite, immediately after the final salām, the specific remembrance reported in the sunnah to be said before turning away from one's place of prayer. The imam then leaves his praying spot, and the act of "turning" is fulfilled when the imam faces the congregation — even without physically leaving his spot — by positioning his right side toward them and his left side toward the qiblah, and this applies even while he is engaged in supplication.
Al-ʿAllāmah Ibn Qāsim al-ʿAbbādī states in his Ḥāshiyah ʿalā al-Tuḥfah (Vol.2/P.105): "It is most virtuous for the imam, once he has given the salām, to rise from his place of prayer immediately afterward." He adds that an exception must be made for the remembrances that are specifically required to be recited before he turns away. He then notes, citing Sharḥ al-ʿUbāb: "Yes, an exception to this rising immediately after the salām applies to the Fajr prayer, due to the authentic report that the Prophet ﷺ, when he prayed Fajr, would remain seated until the sun rose." He further cites, from al-Khādim, the ḥadīth concerning one who recites, at the conclusion of the Fajr prayer while still in the position of crossing his leg to rise: "Lā ilāha illā Allāh, waḥdahu lā sharīka lah..." and the rest of the well-known ḥadīth. He comments that this makes explicit that this particular remembrance is to be recited before the worshipper turns his legs to leave, and the same applies to Maghrib and ʿAṣr, as reported in those contexts as well.
What is meant by "speech" in the relevant ḥadīth is extraneous worldly speech that is not called for after the prayer and for which there is no legitimate excuse. The remembrances reported to be recited upon concluding the prayer, however, do not fall under this category of extraneous speech, since they are themselves required by the sharīʿah.
Al-ʿAllāmah ʿAlī al-Shabrāmalsī states in his Ḥāshiyah ʿalā al-Nihāyah (Vol.1/P.551): "If someone greets a person with salām while he is occupied with reciting this remembrance [i.e., 'Lā ilāha illā Allāh...'], should he return the greeting — without this causing him to forfeit the promised reward, since he is engaged in an obligatory matter — or should he delay returning the greeting until he finishes, this being a legitimate excuse for the delay?" He continues: "I say: the more likely view is the former, and the prohibition on speech is to be understood as applying to extraneous speech for which there is no legitimate excuse. Based on this, should the worshipper give precedence to this remembrance ('Lā ilāha illā Allāh...') or to reciting Sūrat al-Ikhlāṣ ('Qul huwa Allāhu aḥad')? This requires consideration, though it is not unlikely that the remembrance takes precedence, given that the Lawgiver urged hastening to it through his words 'while crossing his leg.' This is not considered ordinary speech, since it is not extraneous to what is required after the prayer."
Accordingly, it is recommended for both the imam and those praying behind him to recite this remembrance and to give it precedence over the other remembrances of the prayer, ensuring it is said before they move from their place. And Allah the Almighty knows best.
My husband discloses all our marital disputes to his family. What is the ruling of Islamic Law on this?
All praise is due to Allah, and peace and blessings be upon our master, the Messenger of Allah.
It is impermissible to divulge spousal secrets or expose one another's faults, whether during the subsistence of the marriage or after its dissolution. The foundational principle governing marital relations is that it is built upon confidentiality and mutual affection. Divulging marital secrets constitutes a breach of trust and a grave sin.
A husband ought not to resort to his family to complain about his wife over every dispute, nor is the reverse permissible for the wife, especially when such actions lead to stirring up malice and animosity between the spouses or between their respective families.
Islam has enjoined the preservation of secrets in general and commanded against revealing them; safeguarding the privacy of the home holds an even greater priority. And Allah Almighty knows best.
What is the ruling of Islamic Law regarding one who slaughters a ewe and it turns out to have been pregnant, and is it permissible to slaughter the ewe if one knows it is pregnant?
Praise be to Allah, and peace and blessings upon our master, the Messenger of Allah.
If a person slaughters a ewe and it turns out to have been pregnant, the fetus becomes lawful (ḥalāl) by virtue of its mother's slaughter (tabaʿan li-ummihā).
It is stated in Mughnī al-Muḥtāj (Vol.6/P.158): "A fetus found dead [after the mother's slaughter], or found alive but in a state resembling that of a slaughtered animal [i.e., dying shortly after], becomes lawful — whether or not it had grown fur — provided it is found in the womb of a mother that was lawfully slaughtered, whether her slaughter was by cutting the throat, or by an arrow or hunting dog sent after her. This is based on the ḥadīth: 'The slaughtering of the fetus is [effected by] the slaughtering of its mother' [narrated by al-Tirmidhī, who graded it ḥasan, and by Ibn Ḥibbān, who graded it ṣaḥīḥ] — meaning that the slaughter which rendered the mother lawful renders the fetus lawful as well, by virtue of following her; and because the fetus is one of her constituent parts, and her slaughter renders lawful all of her parts."
This ruling differs, however, from the case of one who knows from the outset that the ewe is pregnant [and intends to sacrifice her specifically as the udḥiyah while pregnant] — in which case, according to the Shāfi'ī school, she does not fulfill the requirement of a valid sacrifice.
It is stated in Ḥāshiyat al-Bujayrimī 'alā al-Khaṭīb (Vol.4/P.335): "A pregnant animal does not fulfill the requirement [of a valid sacrifice], and this is the authoritative position (al-mu'tamad), because pregnancy diminishes the quality of the meat. As for why such an animal is nevertheless counted as complete [i.e., fully valid] in matters of zakāh, that is because the intent there is reproduction (nasl), not the quality of the meat.". And Allah, the Most High, knows best.
